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DEAL: Differentially Private Auction for
Blockchain based Microgrids Energy Trading
Muneeb Ul Hassan∗, Mubashir Husain Rehmani§, Jinjun Chen∗
∗ Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn VIC 3122, Australia
§ Cork Institute of Technology (CIT), Ireland

Abstract—Modern smart homes are being equipped with certain renewable energy resources that can produce their own electric energy. From time to time, these smart homes or microgrids
are also capable of supplying energy to other houses, buildings,
or energy grid in the time of available self-produced renewable
energy. Therefore, researches have been carried out to develop
optimal trading strategies, and many recent technologies are also
being used in combination with microgrids. One such technology
is blockchain, which works over decentralized distributed ledger.
In this paper, we develop a blockchain based approach for
microgrid energy auction. To make this auction more secure
and private, we use differential privacy technique, which ensures
that no adversary will be able to infer private information of
any participant with confidence. Furthermore, to reduce computational complexity at every trading node, we use consortium
blockchain, in which selected nodes are given authority to add
a new block in the blockchain. Finally, we develop Differentially
private Energy Auction for bLockchain-based microgrid systems
(DEAL). We compare DEAL with Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG)
auction scenario and experimental results demonstrates that
DEAL outperforms VCG mechanism by maximizing sellers’
revenue along with maintaining overall network benefit and social
welfare.
Index Terms—Differential privacy (DP), game theoretic auction, blockchain, microgrid, smart grid (SG), VCG auction.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Microgrid technology caught attention of researchers due
to increasing demand of energy from renewable energy resources. Microgrid is a distributed energy system usually
equipped with more than one renewable energy resource that
are used to generate green electric energy without harming
the environment. Solar, wind, and biomass are commonly
used energy resources by microgrids [1]. One of the major
purpose of such microgrids is storage of electric energy. This
stored energy is further used to benefit both the customers
and utilities in various ways, such as enhancing demand
side management (DSM) by dynamically adjusting prices of
energy by sharing load between microgrid and fossil fuelbased energy system [2]. This stored energy is traded among
different consumers depending upon their demand. In this way,
a reliable energy system can be constructed that will provide
seamless and uninterrupted supply of electric energy.
An important phenomenon of microgrid is trading energy
mutually and with other consumers. This energy trading leads
to many advantages such as increase in revenue of prosumers
by supplying surplus energy to demanding customers. Energy
trading phenomenon is not that simple, and it requires critical decisions, such as what will be the trading charges in

accordance with per unit supplied energy? How the specific
buyers will be determined from a list of buyers? Which
seller to select from the list of sellers? How one will get
maximum benefit/profit? How the complete network will be
profitable? These mentioned decisions are crucial and require
special attention before practical implementation of trading
model of microgrids. If we analyse the mentioned questions
critically, all these questions can be solved by developing an
efficient and optimal auction phenomenon. An efficient auction
phenomenon results in increase of revenue and social welfare
to an optimal level in which every buyer and seller gets some
advantage of participating in auction [3], [4]. This microgrid
auction comes up with two critical challenges. One is to
carry out a secure, user-friendly, and transparent auction, while
second is to develop a game theoretic model which enhances
revenue and social welfare of auction mechanism to an optimal
level. In order to enhance social welfare and revenue of the
network, we enhanced Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction
mechanism and developed a new game-theoretic auction.
Secondly, to overcome the need of security, we integrated
blockchain technology with microgrid system because of its
tamper-proof nature [5], [6].
Blockchain-based microgrid auction provides a decentralized
and trusted atmosphere to buyers and suppliers in which they
can freely trade without the need of a centralized trusted thirdparty. Despite of all these benefits, auction mechanism on
blockchain is not completely secure and is actually vulnerable
to certain privacy attacks. One such attack is inference attack
in which the adversary tries different combinations of ask/bid
in order to predict and get knowledge about the corresponding
outcomes of auction [7], [8]. Another attack which require
special consideration while designing an auction mechanism is
the leakage of individuals’ private information due to repeatability of auction. For example, microgrid energy auctions are
usually repeated after a certain interval of time, thus, certain
clues are always left over in form of historical records which
can further be used to infer ones’ private information [9], [10].
Overcoming such issues become more difficult in a transparent
blockchain technology. Therefore, we used differential privacy
preservation strategy in our auction mechanism which ensures
that presence or absence of participant will have minimal effect
over the outcome of the auction. Thus, leaving no room for
adversary to infer or estimate about behaviour or any particular
individual participating in auction.
In this paper, we propose DEAL, which is a Differentially private Energy Auction for bLockchain-based microgrid. DEAL
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not only maximizes revenue and security, but also guarantees preservation of private individual information along
with protecting bid privacy. DEAL works over differentially
private VCG auction algorithm deployed over blockchainbased microgrid scenario in which prosumers and customers
carry out auction in order to initiate energy trading between
them. We compare our results with VCG auction used by the
authors in [11]. The work in [11] evaluated and proposed the
use of VCG auction mechanism for microgrids energy trading.

A. Related Work
Auction is a well-researched topic and plenty of work have
been carried out to implement and study auction behaviour
in different scenarios. For example, many privacy preserving
auction approaches such as encryption [12] and anonymization [13] have been proposed in literature to carry out certain
optimal auctions. Similarly, certain works are available in
which VCG auction is applied over smart grid energy trading
scenario to maximize its revenue [14]. Moreover, certain properties and criteria of differential privacy have also been studied
in literature to carry out a privacy preserving auction [15].
However, to the best of our knowledge, no work that integrates differential privacy with decentralized blockchain based
microgrid auction have been carried out in the past. For more
details over implementation of blockchain in smart grid, we
suggest readers to study [16]. Moreover, for detailed analysis
of privacy issues in blockchain and directions, we suggest our
readers to consult [17].

B. Major Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
•
•

•
•

We modify VCG auction mechanism for microgrid energy trading in order to maximize revenue of the network.
We provide moderate cost, secure, and private auction mechanism for microgrids based over consortium
blockchain properties.
We preserve bid privacy of individual participants.
We develop DEAL algorithm to protect outcome results
of VCG auction mechanism from adversaries and inferring attacks.

The remainder of paper is organized as follows: In section
2, we provide detailed description of core components of
our proposed strategy. Section 3 contains the functioning and
algorithmic details of DEAL strategy. Furthermore, section 4
discusses simulation results in a brief manner. Finally, section
5 concludes the article.

II. C ORE S YSTEM C OMPONENTS FOR P RIVATE
D ECENTRALIZED E NERGY AUCTION
In this section, the core system components for DEAL
strategy such as VCG auction mechanism, differential privacy,
and consortium blockchain for DEAL are presented.

A. VCG Auction Mechanism
VCG auction is generally referred as a sealed-bid multiple
items auction. In VCG, buyers (bidders) submit their valuations in the form of bids for every item in the auction.
The allocations and payments are done by following specific
rules, mention hereafter, as allocation and payment rules
respectively.
1) Allocation Rule: The aim of allocation rule is to compute
optimal set of bidders according to items in order to maximize
social welfare along with generating a good revenue. The
allocation rule is defined as [18]:
X (b) = argmax
υ∈Λ

n
X

bi (υ)

(1)

i=1

where X (b) is the formula for allocation rule of VCG auction,
bi is specific buyer ID, υ is the valuation of each buyer
(referred as bid). Here, valuations υ belong to a specific
distribution Λ, this distribution will be a set of number in
which buyers can bid their valuations. Getting values from
a specific distribution ensures that only buyers only bid non
negative bids. This distribution can further be adjusted to set
minimum or maximum bid value. This equation checks all
available bids for a specific item and allocates it to the highest
bidder.
2) Payment Rule: In VCG dynamic price auction, the
payment that each bidder has to pay is calculated on the basis
of “harm” his/her presence causes to other participant bidders.
It can be simplified by saying as the difference between the
accumulative sum of bids of other bidders without the winner
and the accumulative sum of bids of other bidders when the
winner is included in the allocation rule [19]. This payment
is also known as “social cost”. In our blockchain-based VCG
auction, the payments can be calculated as:
X
X
bj (υ ∗ )
(2)
bj (υ) −
Pi (b) = max
υ∈Λ

|

j6=i

j6=i

{z

}

(A)
without winner i

|

{z

}

(B)
with winner i

In the above equation, υ ∗ is the outcome of the winner
chosen in Eq. 1, j serves as iterative factor that iterates through
all the values except for winner i. It is worthy to note that
Pi (b) will always yield a nonnegative socially optimal number.
In the above equation, part (B) is the sum of winning bids,
while part (A) is sum of valuations/bids of all participants
that would win if bidder i was not bidding. This can also
be termed as, the difference between optimal social welfare
of all participating players (if i is not the participant) and
welfare of all participating from the selected result (in which
i is participating).
Definition 1: (Truthfulness) Truthfulness is always a dominant strategy in VCG auction. Moreover, the allocation rule
(X (b)) and payment rule (P(b)) provides maximum revenue
and significantly good social welfare if the bids are truthful. In
VCG mechanism, Revenue is the total finalised payment that
sellers will get at the end of auction mechanism. Furthermore,
utility can be termed as the difference between the valuation
of buyer and the hammer price (selected price P(b) after
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payment rule). Similarly, the sum of utilities of all participants
of auction is referred as social welfare, which will indicate the
total amount of profit that is generated in the market because of
that specific auction mechanism [20]. It is compulsory for an
auction mechanism to have nonnegative utility for every buyer,
which means that no buyer will be allocated any slot with
a price more than its valuation. This positive utility ensures
that every participant is satisfied which in turn motivates other
agents as well to participate in the auction. The utility Ui of
VCG auction is referred as quasilinear utility, which is given
as follows [18]:
Ui = Si (υ) − Pi (b)

(3)

In Eq. 3, Si (υ) represents the true valuation of bidder i and
Pi (b) represents the payment that specific bidder will pay [21].
By substituting the value of Eq. 2 in Eq. 3, we get:
X
X
Ui = Si (υ) – [max
bj (υ) −
bj (υ ∗ )]
(4)
υ∈Λ

j6=i

j6=i

After substituting the value of utility in Eq. 4, the following
result is obtained:
X
X
Si (υ) − Pi (b) = Si (υ) – [max
bj (υ) −
bj (υ ∗ )] (5)
υ∈Λ

j6=i

j6=i

This can further be rearranged as follows:
X
X
bj (υ)] (6)
Si (υ) − Pi (b) = Si (υ) +
bj (υ ∗ ) – [max
υ∈Λ

j6=i

|

{z

} |

(A)
combined valuations

j6=i

{z

(B)
bids without
winner i

}

In Eq. 6, part (B) is a constant term, which is independent
of bid of bidder (i). Therefore, bidder i will not be able
to increase or decrease its payment by reporting a lie. The
only possible change that will take place by varying bidder
i bid is in part (A) of Eq. 6, although this change will only
have effect of the value of combined social welfare. Hence,
bidder i will be keener to enhance term (A), which in turn
will lead to truthful reporting of valuation. It can also be said
in a way that lying or false bid will not change the overall
outcome, however, the utility of i depends upon its bidding.
Therefore, bidder i is not left with any other option except
truthful bidding.
B. Differential Privacy
The term “Differential Privacy” was first introduced by
C. Dwork in 2006 to protect the privacy of statistical
datasets [22]. Differential privacy ensures that a result of
an observers’ query should not reveal too much amount of
personal information about a particular individual present in
the dataset [16], [23].
Definition 2: (Differential Privacy) A mechanism F provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy protection for every set having
an output range Ω, and for any two neighboring datasets D and
D′ .
P r[F(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp (ε) · P r[F(D′ ) ∈ Ω] + δ

(7)

This mechanism states that for a particular output range Ω,
eε bounds the ratio between two probabilities. Similarly, if
the value of δ = 0, then the randomized mechanism provides
ε-differential privacy according to its strictest definition. However, (ε, δ)-differential privacy relaxes the strict ε-differential
privacy definition for certain events requiring low probability.
ε-differential privacy is generally said to be pure differential
privacy, however, the form (ε, δ)-differential privacy having
δ > 0 is referred as approximate differential privacy [24].
In Definition 2, the symbol ε represents the parameter called
privacy budget, which further controls the level of guarantee
that differentially private mechanism F provides [25]. Smaller
value of ε ensures stronger privacy guarantee, therefore in
practice, the value of ε is usually set less than unity “1”.
The term sensitivity determines the amount of perturbation which is required to protect the data from adversary.
Sensitivity will calibrate the volume/amount of noise for the
mechanism F(D). It can formally be defined as follows:
Definition 3: (Sensitivity) Suppose a random query is given
to the mechanism F(.), then the value of sensitivity ∆FS can
be defined as:
∆FS = max′ ||F(D) − F(D′ )||
D,D

(8)

1) Laplace Mechanism: Laplace mechanism is basically
based over addition of controlled amount of Laplacian noise
to the analyst query output. The noise is calculated by
sampling it via Laplace distribution, in which µ acts as a
centre point and σ acts as a scaling factor [26]. The formula
for basic Laplace mechanism is:
|b|
1
exp(− )
(9)
2σ
σ
Definition 4: (Laplace Mechanism) Let F be a function, D
be a dataset in a range R, the mechanism L is ε-differentially
private if it adds Laplacian noise using the given formula on
the basis of Eq. 7 as follows:
Lap(b) =

∆F
(10)
ε
2) Exponential Mechanism: A powerful method to execute
differential privacy in a game-theoretic auction is Exponential
mechanism. In this mechanism, a selection probability is
assigned to every possible outcome in accordance to a utility
function (also named as score function), which maps input and
output pairs to a utility score.
Definition 5: (Exponential Mechanism) Let N (D, Φ) be
a utility (score) function of input data D which calculates
the output Φ in a range P (Φ ∈ P), then the Exponential
mechanism F will be ε-differentially private if
L(D) = F (D)

P r[F(D, N , P) = N ] ∝ exp(

εN (D, Φ)
)
2∆N

(11)

C. Consortium Blockchain for DEAL
The concept of blockchain flourished after the introduction
of Bitcoin in 2008 by S. Nakamoto [27], [28]. Generally,
blockchain is divided into three further types; private, public,
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Fig. 1: System model of DEAL strategy describing the complete auction scenario between microgrid, buyers, energy power
grid, and ETNs, along with information representation of energy and data flow.

and consortium [29], [30]. In this paper, we use the third
type named as consortium blockchain, that is special type
of blockchain in which consensus is carried out using some
pre-selected nodes (energy trading nodes (ETNs) in our case).
The controlling nodes (ETNs) are authorized to mine a new
block in the network by carrying out consensus process. Major
reason behind use of consortium blockchain is to facilitate
such nodes which does not have high computational power.
So that, the nodes that cannot solve complex cryptographic
puzzle can also take part in the trading process.
1) “Blocks” Data Storage Entity: Blockchain network
maintains uninform record of transactions in form of data
storage entities named as “blocks” [31]. These blocks are
fault-tolerant, append-only, shared, and distributed among all
consensus carrying nodes of blockchain [32]. In DEAL strategy, ETNs are the consensus nodes which are responsible for
addition of blocks in the network. A brief illustration of ETNs,
and their connection with microgrid, and blockchain network
is provided in Fig. 2. Mining and storing a new block in
the network require high computational power. Therefore, we
chose ETNs as authoritative nodes, which control the process
of consensus. ETNs collect, handle, manage, and audit their
local transactional records. ETNs collect records, audit them
(with help of consensus), and then structure these records
into blocks after encryption. Once a block gets added in the
blockchain network (through consensus mechanism, defined
hereafter), it becomes publicly accessible to all blockchain
nodes (i.e. microgrid users, sellers, buyers, and ETNs), however, this record is tamper-proof, therefore these nodes can
only view the data and cannot change it.
2) DEAL Coin: DEAL coin is a trading entity for our
proposed mechanism, which is used to carry out trading,
provide incentives, and charge penalties to participating nodes.
Each blockchain node will have a cryptographic wallet to store
and manage these energy coins. Actual value of this energy
coin can be controlled by ETNs or can also be hard coded in
the genesis node.

3) Consensus Mechanism: In this paper, we use proof of
work (PoW) consensus algorithm, which is also the backbone
of Bitcoin technology. Consensus nodes (also known as ETNs)
are chosen by mutual agreement between all participating
nodes. These nodes are not permanent and can be changed
afterwards if some node does not follow the legal rules.
a) Proof-of-Work Consensus: We are using PoW consensus mechanism in our DEAL strategy because it ensures
a healthy competition among mining nodes and every miner
gets a reward after successfully mining a block. Moreover,
PoW is less prone to security attacks as compared to other
consensus mechanisms, because attacker require to control
minimum of 51% computational power in order to hack
complete network. In order to add new transactional record in
blockchain, all ETNs in the network will carry out consensus.
PoW consensus ensures the appending of legitimate data in the
blockchain along with a guarantee that there is no conflict in
the transaction and historical records of data [33], [34]. PoW
used for ETNs in our strategy is similar to the mechanism
used in Bitcoin technology, in which a unique hash value is
generated every time along with a certain puzzle for every
new block that needs to be mined in blockchain. This specific
unique hash value serves as a link between the newly appended
block and the prior block in that chain. ETNs solve a puzzle
(by finding valid PoW) in order to mine a block in the network,
and thus, they do also compete with each other to add the
blocks as quick as possible. Similarly, this competition turns
out to be in favour the fastest ETN which gets rewards in
the form of DEAL coin every time a new block is added
in blockchain. During consensus process, an ETN audits the
auction records, structure these records in the form of a new
block to verify the block from other ETNs during the PoW
consensus process.
Similarly, the microgrids with maximum contribution in the
network do also gets incentives in the form of DEAL coins
from their respective ETNs. These incentives serve as a reward
that will encourage more microgrids to take part in the auction
process and to contribute more energy to the grid network.
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These rewards are given on the basis of energy recorded by
smart meter.
III. D IFFERENTIALLY P RIVATE AUCTION M ODEL
In this section, we discuss motivation, system model, design
goals, and adversary model of DEAL mechanism.
A. Motivation of DEAL
The motivation of our DEAL strategy is as follows:
• Traditional smart grid auctions are usually carried out
via some intermediary of centralized auction authority,
which leads to lack of trust in the network. Our proposed
blockchain based DEAL strategy ensures that every participant gets its fair share and no intermediary can alter
with auction mechanism.
• Conventional VCG auction is not inclined towards maximizing revenue of sellers. However, in DEAL we modified VCG auction to provide maximum possible revenue
to sellers.
• Typical auction approaches does not consider any privacy
parameter and are prone to certain privacy attacks, such
as inference attack. In our proposed DEAL strategy, we
integrated differential privacy to ensure bidding privacy
of bidders participating in decentralized auction.

B. Problem Definition
Problem definition of our proposed work consists of three
major points which are defined as follows:
• How to maximize revenue and utility of sellers and buyers
respectively in order to motivate more microgrid sellers
to participate in auction process?
• How to provide a secure and transparent auction mechanism?
• How to preserve true valuations of bidders in VCG
auction mechanism in order to protect their privacy and
trust?
C. System Model of DEAL
DEAL consist of three major entities, i.e., microgrids (integrated with homes), buyer homes/buildings, and blockchains’
distributed ledger. Microgrid can be a smart home or a network
of homes that are capable of producing energy from different
renewable energy resources such as solar, wind, biomass,
etc. Microgrids are autonomous and can power the connected
homes, and even surplus electricity can be traded into the network. Each microgrid has storage capacity where it can store
its surplus energy which can be used for trading or usage at the
time of need. Similarly, these microgrids are also connected
with certain other homes and building that are not autonomous
and require a continuous supply of electricity (which usually
comes from electric grid station). These buildings/homes can
request microgrids to sell its extra energy to earn some profit.
This trading leads to the formation of an auction strategy,
which is used to carry out a type of trading in which every
participant will be happy and gets some benefits.

Fig. 2: Venn diagram based visual illustration of DEAL

Traditional auctions are usually carried out using an intermediary or centralized auctioneer. However, central auctioneer has
certain disadvantages and may cause trust, security, and privacy leakages especially when using VCG auction (discussed
in Section III). Here, the next entity of our DEAL strategy
comes over which is blockchain-based distributed ledger. As
discussed earlier, blockchain is a decentralized distributed
ledger which ensures the correctness of records throughout the
network. This step is carried out with the help of ETNs, which
work as brokers to provide access to buyers and microgrids in
order to trade energy. Each microgrid send a request to ETN
about their excessive electric energy along with minimum selling price. ETNs announces the available amount of energy to
buyers in the network. Energy buyers then submit their bids to
network, and ETN carry out auction process and match energy
trading pairs of microgrids and energy buyers. Nevertheless,
integration of consortium blockchain in microgrid auction has
solved certain security and trust issues, but due to its public
nature it also raises large number of privacy threats. In order
to overcome this, our DEAL strategy integrated differential
privacy protection strategy with blockchain-based microgrid
auction.
The dynamic nature of differential privacy ensures that adversary may not be able to infer any private information about
auctions’ participants. Despite of public availability of auction
results, differential privacy is one of the most optimal strategy
which preserves auction privacy. Furthermore, DEAL ensures
the truthfulness and revenue maximization of the network
using VCG auction mechanism. In order to make DEAL
understandable for generalist audience, we also developed a
pseudocode based algorithm which is given in Algorithm 1.
A graphical illustration of our system model is given in Fig. 1.

D. Design Goals
Previous technical works over microgrid auction, differentially private auction, and blockchain-based auction considered
certain problems on either topic individually, but none of the
work from past literature considered preservation of individuals and bidding privacy in blockchain-based microgrid scenario using differential privacy protection. In order to visualize
DEAL strategy from truthfulness, privacy, and social welfare
perspective, we made a Venn diagram based illustration, which
is given in Fig. 2. Our developed DEAL strategy has following
design goals:
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•

•
•
•

•

Integrating consortium blockchain technology with microgrid energy trading system by using ETNs as authoritative nodes.
Ensuring security during bidding by using cryptographic
encryption of blockchain technology.
Maintaining a decentralized and distributed ledger in
auction to ensure transparency in the network.
Achieving complete bid privacy and individual record
privacy using differential privacy so that nobody may be
able to estimate about future bids or auction outcomes.
Enhancing revenue and social welfare of auction mechanism to ensure that every auction participant gets benefit
from participating in the auction.

E. Adversary Model
In DEAL, owners of energy buying homes and buildings
submit their truthful valuations to auctioneer in order to carry
out VCG auction. However, the value of a specific energy slot
is very private information in the sight of buyers. Similarly, if
someone gets to know the final output prices of VCG auction,
then it can easily infer the valuations and bidding prices of
winners and other bidders because it is a sealed bid auction.
So, revealing of valuations of energy buyers will directly put
these bidders at the risk of disclosure of their sensitive information. Therefore, we aim to protect this sensitive bidders’
information from different adversaries within or outside the
decentralized blockchain network. Contrary to this, if bidders
have a risk of leakage of their valuations, then they will
not report their truthful valuations to the mechanism. Which
will lead to the denial of truthfulness of VCG mechanism,
along with the reduction in social welfare and revenue of the
auction. In order to overcome all this situation, we propose
a decentralized differentially private auction mechanism that
preserves the valuations of bidders by using the concept of
dual differential privacy as demonstrated in the next sections.

IV. P RIVATE D ECENTRALIZED E NERGY AUCTION
DEAL S TRATEGY

USING

In this section, operational details, and functioning of DEAL
strategy is discussed as follows:
A. Operation Details of DEAL
DEAL works over the principle of integration of differential
privacy in VCG auction operating over consortium blockchain.
1) Parameter and Roles Initialization: In DEAL, each
bidder and seller is formed a legitimate entity after a formal
registration over a trusted authority, i.e. smart grid base station
controlled by government authorities. During registration, the
agent declares that whether it wants to join as buyer or
seller. The assigned roles cannot be changed during an auction
process, and one have to re-register itself with a new one if
there comes any change. Once an agent joins the blockchain
network, it gets its public and private key to carry out cryptographic transactions in the network. Similarly, we use elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm in order to carry out cryptographic transactions in the network, as demonstrated in [35].

Each agent in the network is identified using its true identity,
public key, and private key generated by authorities. Moreover,
in order to carry out transactions and trade DEAL coins,
agents do require x number of cryptographic wallet addresses
(W ADi,j ), which the agents (Ai ) can request to authorities
after joining the blockchain network. In here, i is the node
identity and j is the specific address ID within that wallet. The
governing authority is responsible to provide every agent with
an appended list of public key, private key, and wallet address
(P BKi , P RKi , [W ADi,j ]xj=1 ). This mapping list, especially
the wallet addresses can be used to carry out auction and
trading after authorization by ETN of that area. A memory
pool, which is further connected to decentralized distributed
ledger stores the record of every auction and transaction in the
network. This record is uniformly updated over the distributed
ledger via ETNs.
2) Collecting Bids and Pre-Requisites of Auction: After
parameters and roles initialization, the next step is to advertise
the available energy slots and collect bids, which is carried out
by the use of ETNs. ETN collects the information about available energy from all microgrids with respect to a pre-decided
geographical distance, this can also be distance dependent and
concept of Energy Internet can be used in order to route energy
in the most optimal manner. Afterwards, ETNs broadcast this
energy to all available buyers in the network. The buyers then
check the available energy and provide their responses back
to ETNs. ETNs collects the bids and carry out auction using
our proposed DEAL strategy.
3) Carrying out Auction: Auction mechanism in the network is carried out using the DEAL strategy, in which all
available nodes participate, and winners are determined in
accordance with their bids and available energy slots. As
ETN has collected all the bids of buyers, it carries out VCG
auction and then modify it further to enhance the privacy
using differential privacy and maximize the revenue using
our proposed methodology. The detailed elaboration of DEAL
mechanism is given in Section III. Similarly, after a specific
period of time, the microgrids that have provided maximum
amount of energy are incentivized in the form of DEAL coins.
Along with this, the ETN winning the consensus mechanism
is rewarded with certain DEAL coins according to the strategy.
4) Paying and Auditing Transactions: After completion of
auction, all buyers pay the calculated amount to microgrids
through wallet address of the specific microgrid. The buyers
transfer DEAL coins from their wallet to the wallet of microgrid, which further collects the amount and verify it by using
digital signature. These digitally signed approved transaction
records are further sent to ETNs for auditing.
5) Carrying out PoW consensus: After a specific interval of
time, ETNs collect all energy and coin transaction records of
their local network, encrypt them, and then protect them by using digital signature. This encryption and signature process is
carried out to ensure the accuracy, authenticity, and immutability of data. These transaction records are then combined to
form a block like structure which do also contains the address
of previous block in the chain. Furthermore, ETN calculates
the hash value of this block over a random nonce value (e.g.,
x) to mine it in the chain using PoW consensus. Consensus
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is carried out similar to the method of Bitcoin consensus, in
which timestamp, hash value and Merkle root of transaction is
used to determine the hash value in accordance with difficulty,
such as HashV alue(x + Pdata ) < ConsensusDifficulty) [36].
The speed of mining and block addition depends upon the
ConsensusDifficulty which is a variable entity and is varied
accordingly by authorities to control block mining rate. In our
DEAL mechanism, consensus difficulty is varied to make sure
that every block gets mined at least after 10 minutes.
6) Appending and Verifying the Block using Consensus:
The fastest ETN to achieve PoW becomes the leader of
that consensus process. This leader further broadcasts the
compiled block to all authorized ETN nodes, which audit
this block to ensure the verification and mutual supervision
in the network. These ETNs broadcast their report in the
network after auditing the received block. After this, each
ETN compare their result with the result of other ETNs in the
network. This comparison result is further sent to the network
along with the signature of each ETN. The leader then does a
statistical analysis of data to ensure that there is not conflict
in the block. If the block is free from conflict, then the block
is appended in the blockchain network in chronological order.
The total time required to reach the consensus is 10 minute,
which is independent of the size of nodes in the network [37].
However, if there arises any conflict or any ETN disapproves
the block, then leader analyse all results in a comprehensive
manner and broadcast the disputed block again to all ETNs for
re-auditing. After this, the same process is carried out again,
and the results are analysed again for all ETNs along with their
ring signatures. This correspondence between ETNs help out
to reach the compromised ETN, which is held accountable
afterwards.

Algorithm 1 Algorithmic Implementation of DEAL
Input: Set of Bidders N, buyers bids V, set of available energy slots S, sensitivity Sp ,
Laplace privacy budget ε1 , Exponential privacy budget ε2
Output: Set of Winners W, Differentially private final price P f
(1) Carrying out VCG Auction

1: for i ← 1 to Smax do
2:
for j ← 1 to Nmax do
3:
Calculate Winner for ith slot according to allocation rule
P
4:
Wi (b) = argmaxυ j∈N bj (υ)
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:

// Wi (bj ) is the winner of slot S(i)
end for
for k ← 1 to Nmax do
Compute VCG payment for kth bidder assigned ith slot
P
P
VP i (k) = maxυ j6=i bj (υ) − j6=i bj (υ ∗ )

end for
Link Winners with their allocated slots and payments in form of a Matrix
W[Si , VP i ]
11: end for
(2) Generate Payment Groups using Laplace Differential Privacy

12: for i ← 1 to Wmax do
13:
Base price = bp ← VP i
14:
Bid of winner i = bv ← V (Wi )
15:
Difference = dv = bv - bp
16:
Calculate mean (µ) and noise scale (sc)
17:
µ = dv/2
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:

sc =

r

(sd)ε 2
1
2Nx

Generate random Laplacian noise using normal probability distribution
// Our mechanism will generate random Laplacian noise between [(µ − sc) to
(µ + sc)], here sc depends upon privacy budget ε1 .
X ← group size
for j ← 1 to X do
~ i (append) = bp + Lap(F; µ, sc)
LP
end for
// After this, we get a group of prices of length X for ith winner.
end for
(3) Computing probability distribution via Exponential DP

25: for i ← 1 to LPmax do
~ , Ps ) ← LP
~ (P s)
26:
q(LP
27:
∆q ← Sp
28:
Pr (F(q, LP, Ps ) = P s) ←
ε2 .q(LP,Ps )
)
2∆q
P
ε2 .q(LP,Ps′ )
)
Ps ′ ∈LP (Ps ) exp(
2∆q

exp(

B. Functioning and Problem Formalization of DEAL
In this section, we propose DEAL mechanism to carry out
differentially private δ-revenue maximizing auction operating
over decentralized blockchain network for microgrids energy
trading. The mechanism is used to determine the winner, winning price, and system utility and revenue. The detailed pseudo
code based functioning of DEAL mechanism is presented in
Algorithm 1.
1) Preliminaries of DEAL:
a) Microgrids: Microgrids send their available energy
slots, along with its time and available energy to auctioneer.
The energy slot vector for it h slot of total n number of
n
slots is Sn
i = {Si |j ∈ M}. The aim of every microgrid
agent is to maximize its revenue, and in order to increase its
revenue, the auctioneer solves a problem based over DEAL
auction algorithm. The combined revenue of microgrids is
accumulated at the end of auction in order to determine the
total revenue generation in the network. The aim of our DEAL
mechanism is to enhance the revenue so that more sellers
participate in the auction. The problem for revenue calculation
sums up all payments (Pi ) for m number of buyers, the
formula is given as follows:
Total Revenue (R) =

m
X
i

(Pi )

(12)

29: end for
30: Ps ← F(q, LP, Ps ) // Probability distribution
31: Pf ← final selected price via probability distribution

//P f is the price ith bidder (Wi ) will pay for selected slot.

32: return W, Pf

b) Buyers (homes, buildings): Buyers analyse the available energy slots and place their bids for every slot in the
form of a bid vector for every buyer. It is a requirement of
VCG auction that the buyer has to bid for every available
slot, however, if some buyer does not bid for some specific
energy slot, then its bid will be counted as zero and that buyer
will never be allocated that specific slot, because the utility of
buyers always needs to be positive. Individual valuations of it h
buyers in vector form Bin = {bni ∈ N} are sent to auctioneer
which further processes these valuations and carry out auction.
The aim of buyers is to maximize their utility, for which they
have to solve the following problem:
Utility (Ui ) = argmax (Bi –Pi )

(13)

Bin

The above equation computes utility Ui of DEAL mechanism
for buyers by subtracting each bid Bi from the payment Pi for
that specific buyer. The sum of all utilities of buyers is called
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as social welfare of the network which is denoted as follows:
n
X
(14)
(argmax (Bi –Pi ))
Social Welfare (SW ) =
Bin

i

c) Auctioneer: Auctioneer is responsible to carry out
decentralized differentially private VCG auction along with
maximizing the network revenue and social welfare. In our
scenario, auctioneer collects the bids and energy information
from buyers and sellers respective and determine the winners
and winning price. After completion of auction, the auctioneer
does solves the problem to calculate total revenue and social
welfare of the network. Here, we formed a new variable named
as “Network Benefit (NB)”, which shows the accumulative
sum of revenue and social welfare of the network. The aim
of auctioneer is to maximize NB, in order to attract more
buyers and sellers to participate in the auction. The problem
for calculation of NB is given as follows:
NB =

m
X
i

(Pi ) +

n
X
i

(argmax (Bi –Pi ))

(15)

Bin

Eq. 15 computes network
benefit by adding payment
Pm
(P
received
by
seller
(
i )) and utility of buyers
i
P
( ni (argmaxBin (Bi –Pi ))) which is also given in Eq. 14.

2) Problem Formalization: In DEAL strategy, homes or
building who require energy act as buying entities, and the
microgrid smart homes act as selling entities. Sellers will
submit their available energy and time slots to auctioneer,
which is advertised afterwards, and the buyers will submit
their bids after viewing the advertised energy slots. After
successful collection of bids, the auctioneer will carry out
auction using the allocation and payment rule provided in
Section 2. In further equations, “i” will denote the buyer
number (i ∈ n) and “j” (j ∈ m) will denote the seller. In
order to proceed further, we assume that there are “n” number
of buyers (i = {1, 2, 3...n}) and “m” (j = {1, 2, 3...m})
number of sellers in the blockchain environment. Since we
want everyone to participate in the auction, we make an
assumption that microgrid sellers will always provide the
energy cheaper than the actual energy grid which is controlled
by government. Furthermore, we assume that the number of
buyers is always greater than or at least equal to number
of sellers (n ≥ m). We further divided the energy trading
into slots, which demonstrates the exact time period at which
the supply of energy will be available, we denoted it with T
(T = {1, 2.3...t}). The slots can be decided by the mutual
agreement, for example there may be 24 hourly slots in a
day, or 12 slots of 2 hours, etc. Once the allocation and
VCG payment is calculated, the auctioneer further proceeds to
make the payments differentially private by using the revenue
maximizing DEAL algorithm proposed in this paper. Finally,
a matrix WM is formed which will indicate the buyer id,
allocated slot number, seller of slot, and the payment decided
for that slot. The matrix will look as follows:


b i ti s i p i

.. 
.. ..
(16)
W M =  ...
.
. .
bn

ti

si

pi

3) Differentially Private Pricing Strategy: One of the major
purpose of DEAL strategy is to optimize revenue of VCG
mechanism while preserving the bids privacy. It is because
in VCG mechanism, is one gets to know about the actual
price that a buyer is paying, and the adversary has a complete
record of prices from some previous auctions, it can easily
infer the private information of specific buyers, such as their
private valuations for a specific energy slot, valuations for
specific time, etc. Therefore, to preserve bid privacy, we use
the concept of differential privacy in decentralized auctions
scenario. In this section, we start the discussion from part
(2) of Algorithm 1. We assume that auctioneer has calculated
VCG payments and has decided the winners of specific slots
and only the calculation of final price is left II-A. We use
dual differential privacy mechanism, in which we use both
Laplacian mechanism and Exponential mechanism to make
our pricing strategy more private. At first, the Laplacian
mechanism collects data from step (1) and calculates mean
and noise scale (sc) on the basic of VCG price (also called
as base price). The intensity of noise scale is controlled by
the privacy parameter ε1 which in turn controls the amount of
noise generated by Laplacian mechanism. The formulas used
µ = dv/2
(17)
are as follows [1]:

sc =

s

(sd)ε 21
2Nx

(18)

After calculation of mean and noise scale, Laplacian mechanism is used to generate a group of number in accordance
with noise scale and mean value. As discussed earlier, ε1
controls the intensity of noise, and it can be varied to increase
or decrease the level required privacy. In this experiment, we
use ε1 = 1, but this can be changed depending up the demand
and need of application. Afterwards, Laplace mechanism generates a random number using the basic differentially private
Laplacian mechanism, which is given as follows:



q
(sd)ε 21
=
f x; µ,
2Nx

r 1

2

−

.e
2

|x−µ|
r

(sd)ε 2
1
2Nx

(sd)ε
1
2Nx

!

(19)

In above equation, we take Nx = 1 for single sample
and it can be varied according to sample size. Similarly, the
value of x is generated using the random Laplace mechanism
of simulation environment. After simplification, the above
equation can be re-written for noise calculation as
√

noise =
t

√ 1
.e
( 2)(sd)ε1

2|x|
(sd)ε 21

−√

!

(20)

Once, the group is generated, we further generate the final
output group to be fed into exponential mechanism. The final
noise array is generated by appending all values and adding
the base price value to them individually using the following
formula.
~ i (append) = bp + Lap(F; µ, sd)
LP
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Here, our section (2) of algorithm completes up and the output
result is fed to section (3), in which Exponential mechanism is
used to decide the differentially private price of energy slot. In
this part of algorithm, the group size of calculated Laplacian
price is used to determine the size of probability distribution of
Exponential mechanism. Two privacy controlling parameters
are used in exponential mechanism, one is ∆q (also known as
sensitivity), and second is ε2 (also called as privacy budget).
It is worth to remind that in Laplacian mechanism, we used
privacy budget value as 1 (varepsilon1 = 1). However,
in Exponential mechanism, we will vary the privacy budget
according to the experimental setup. Similarly, the value of
∆q also depends upon the requirement of privacy and it can
vary accordingly. Different researchers calculate sensitivity
via different methods, so it depends upon the discretion of
the researcher implementing it up. An important function of
~ , Ps )]”. The
Exponential mechanism is “scoref unction[q(LP
score function explains that how good is the output Ps is for
the given dataset LP . Similarly, the choice of a good score
function also depends upon the requirement of application, in
our mechanism, we use formal Exponential score function in
order to carry out optimal price selection using differential
privacy mechanism. After getting Laplacian price group, Exponential mechanism generate a probability distribution of the
group prices using the mechanism as follows [38]:
Pr (F(M ) = P s) ∝ P

s)
)
exp( ε2 .q(LP,P
2∆q

Ps ′ ∈LP (Ps )

exp(

ε2 .q(LP,Ps′ )
)
2∆q

(22)

In above equation, M = (q, LP, Ps ).
After generating Exponential probability distribution, a temporary price is selected using the random mechanism, which
is further checked for all the constraints such as the selected
price should provide non-negative utility, positive revenue, etc.
If the selected price fulfils all the requirements, then the price
is finalized and is considered to be selling price (Pf ) that ith
buyer has to pay for selected slot. As true valuation of bidder
is the base price which is used to determine this differentially
private price, so our proposed strategy guarantees that price
selection is completely random. This randomness ensures
that no adversary can get to know the original valuation of
buyer/bidder. Therefore, DEAL mechanism provides 100%
privacy guarantee to participating bidders.
Theorem 1: (DEAL satisfies ε-differential privacy)
For any two set of bidders valuations B = (b1 , b2 , .....bn ) and
B ′ = (b1 , b2 , .....bn ) having a difference of only one valuation.
The output probability distribution of DEAL mechanism determined using Eq. 22 (ε2 = ε). So, in accordance with the
differential privacy definition, for a similar output x, we get
the following result [38].
exp( ε.q(B,x)
)
2∆q

Pr [DEAL(B) = x]
=
Pr [DEAL(B ′ ) = x]

P
P

i∈N

exp( ε.q(B,x)
)
2∆q
′

,x)
exp( ε.q(B
)
2∆q

≤ exp(ε) (23)

′

i∈N

,x)
)
exp( ε.q(B
2∆q

According to proof of differential privacy in [39], the
equation 23 satisfies ε-differential privacy, as if the input is

data varied by only one element, then the output varies no
more than exp(ε). This can formally be written as:
Pr [DEAL(B) = x] ≤ Pr [DEAL(B ′ ) = x]. exp(ε)

(24)

Keeping in view all above discussion, we can conclude that
our proposed DEAL mechanism satisfies ε-differential privacy
condition.
V. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance of DEAL, we consider
three parameters named as revenue (R), buyers utility (BU),
and network benefit (NB). We compare our results with VCG
auction used by the authors in [11]. In order to carry out
experiments, we use Pandas v0.24 and NumPy v1.14 libraries
over Python 3.0 and iterated our auction for 50, 100, 150, 200,
and 250 buyers. In every auction simulation, we took the data
set of n buyers and n-1 sellers. We generate output results
by dealing with five different parameters named as revenue,
utility, NB, average utility per buyer, and average revenue
per seller. Furthermore, one of the most important factor in
differentially private preservation strategy is the change in
output by varying value of ε, which is ε2 in our case for
exponential privacy preservation according to Algorithm 1. In
our experiments, we conducted auction by varying ε2 at three
different privacy levels such as 0.01, 0.1, and 0.5. Furthermore,
we assumed that the sellers will always sell their electricity
in a price less than the energy price from smart grid. This
further leads to two important points, (i) if the price of energy
is greater than the price of smart grid energy, then there is no
reason left for buyers to participate in auction as they can
simply purchase the energy at lower cost directly from grid
station. (ii) hence, buyers are getting energy at low cost as
compared to price of grid station, so the major objective is
to encourage more and more microgrid sellers to participate
and this can only be done by maximizing their revenue. The
detailed description of auction, it’s functioning, and privacy
preservation according to selected parameters is given below
in this section.
A. Differentially Private Revenue Maximization
During decentralized energy trading, maximizing revenue is
the most important objective. Revenue is termed as the total
amount of cash collected. In our scenario, the total amount
that a seller gets after completion of auction is the revenue
of that seller, and the accumulated sum of all revenues is
the total revenue of our system. Furthermore, we evaluated
average seller revenue, which is a ratio that demonstrates the
average revenue a seller will generate if he/she participates
in the auction mechanism. In order to maximize revenue, we
modified the payment rule of VCG mechanism and ensured
that our differentially private auction generates more revenue
as compared to VCG mechanism. The graphical illustration of
outcomes of DEAL auction in comparison with VCG auction
is presented in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3a, the graph demonstrates
revenues of DEAL strategy in comparison with VCG auction.
We categorized graph in two way, first one is the change of
revenue with respect to privacy parameter ǫ and the second one
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 3: R EVENUE EVALUATION ON THE BASIS OF DEAL MECHANISM AND VCG AUCTION
(a) Accumulative Revenue of Network (b) Average Revenue per Buyer

(a)

MECHANISM

(b)

Fig. 4: Utility evaluation of buyers on the basis of DEAL mechanism and VCG auction mechanism
(a) Accumulative Utility of Network (b) Average Utility per Buyer

Fig. 5: Network benefit of participating agents according to
DEAL and VCG mechanism

However, the clear difference between revenues of DEAL and
VCG can be observed even with the increase in number of
buyers. Another important parameter that is normally used
to determine the efficiency of an auction mechanism is the
average revenue per seller. We calculate average revenue for all
our scenarios and presented its graphical illustration in Fig. 3b.
From the figure, it can be observed that revenue of DEAL
mechanism always outclasses the revenue of VCG auction.
Keeping of view all the discussion, we can conclude that DEAL
maximized revenue of VCG mechanism along with preserving
the privacy of bidders.
B. Buyers Utility

is the change in revenue by varying number of buyers/bidders.
From ε point of view, a slight increase in the revenue can
be observed when value of ε is varied from 0.01 to 0.1.
However, the value of utility does not really change when
this value is raised to 0.5. Since, lower value of epsilon (such
as 0.01) is demanded, therefore it can be said that there is
a slight decrease in revenue with the decrease in privacy
level. However, if we compare these values with VCG auction
revenue, we can see a clear difference that DEAL auction
strategy outperforms VCG auction mechanism, because of
modifications made in the payment rule. Similarly, from the
point of view of number of buyers, it can be observed that the
revenue increases with the increase in buyers, this is because
the number of sales also increase with the number of bidders.

Enhancing utility of buyers and having non-zero utility is
also an important objective of any auction mechanism. In
DEAL mechanism, we ensured that no should have negative
utility and the level of satisfaction or social welfare is always
positive. Similarly, in our scenario, revenue and utility are
linked with each other as revenue is the degree of happiness of
sellers and utility is the degree of satisfaction of buyers. So,
there is always a trade-off between both of them. However,
we tried to enhance the revenue of buyers along with not
decreasing utility to a larger extent. The payment values are
selected using differential privacy Laplacian and Exponential
distribution, and thus, this payment ensured that the revenue
always gets maximized, therefore the slight decrease in utility
can be observed in our simulation results as compared to VCG
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mechanism. The detailed graphs showing the auction utility is
given in Fig. 4.
Graph in Fig. 4a demonstrate the trend of utility with respect
to variation in privacy parameter (ε) and number of buyers. It
can be observed that utility value increases with the increase
in number of buyers, because it is the accumulative sum of
all utilities. However, the privacy parameter has varied effect
over utility values. For example, the value of utility with
100 buyers is maximum with ε = 0.1, same goes with other
presented graphs as well. This is because the trade-off between
revenue and utility supports the utility maximization at ε =
0.1. However, from the presented graphs, we can visualize
that if we decrease the value of ε, we will increase the level
of privacy, but utility will decrease. Similarly, in Fig. 4b,
the average utility per buyers also demonstrates the similar
output and ensures that the level of social welfare of buyers is
always satisfactory. This utility is actually the buyers’ utility
also named as social welfare, so it should not be mixed with
the usefulness (utility) of data which is usually referred in
differential privacy papers. In DEAL, the utility reflects the
level of satisfaction of buyers according to their valuation and
payment, and it should not be mixed with the privacy value
or data usefulness. By viewing all graphs, it can easily be
concluded that DEAL provides satisfactory utility ratio for all
its bidders and encourages bidders to participate in auction
because of non-negative utility.
C. Network Benefit
We introduced a new parameter named as network benefit.
The value of network benefits is the sum of total revenue
and utility of the network in that particular scenario. We
calculated the network benefit of VCG and DEAL auctions for
different buyers and different privacy preservation scenarios.
The graph showing the comparison of network benefit is
provided in Fig. 5. It can be seen from the graph that the
value of network benefits is exactly the same for both DEAL
and VCG auction. This shows that the overall performance
of DEAL is equal to optimal VCG mechanism. Though, the
trade-off between revenue and utility is adjusted because of
the requirement of maximizing of revenue. Besides, DEAL
mechanism also ensures bid privacy by using modern differentially private privacy preservation. However, basic VCG
mechanism in the presented paper do not ensures the privacy of
bids and any adversary can infer private information of buyers
by analysing winning price and comparing it with previous
data. Furthermore, DEAL also provides decentralized energy
trading that ensures the security and transparency in auction
mechanism, which further increases the trust of participating
agents. By analysing all graphical values from perspective
of participants, it can be concluded that DEAL outperforms
VCG mechanism by maximizing auction revenue along with
enhancing utility and overall network benefit.
D. Privacy Analysis
Final price in DEAL mechanism is picked by dual differential privacy mechanism; first random string is generated
using Laplace differential privacy and afterwards, exponential

privacy protection mechanism is used to pick a completely random price according to chose distribution. In order to carry out
privacy analysis, we thoroughly compared randomly picked
price with theoretic bounds of differential privacy presented
in Theorem 1 and Definition 2. After careful analysis, we can
say that our proposed DEAL mechanism fulfils all theoretical
implications of differential privacy and is one of the most
suitable mechanism to preserve bidding privacy for microgrids
auction.
VI. C ONCLUSION
Microgrids are capable of generating, storing, and distributing energy to the network in the time of need using solar, wind
and similar renewable energy resources. Usually microgrids
produce more than the required amount of energy and trade the
surplus energy in order to generate some profit. This trading
works in accordance with the rules provided by governing
authorities. The trading is not completely secure and private;
therefore, researchers are working over formulation of latest
technologies to make it more efficient. Nowadays, modern
trading technologies do also discuss the use of blockchain
in trading due to its decentralized, timestamped, transparent,
and immutable nature. However, blockchain in not an all one
solution to all auction/trading problems as it can easily cause
leakage of because of its transparent nature. In this paper, we
propose a decentralized auction strategy for microgrid energy
trading and preserved bid privacy by using differential privacy
protection operating over consortium blockchain technology.
To be more precise, we develop Differentially private Energy
Auction for bLockchain-based microgrid systems (DEAL)
mechanism, which preserves the privacy of participants of
auction by effectively preserving the data using Laplacian and
Exponential privacy protection. We further evaluated DEAL in
different auction scenarios and compared it with optimal VCG
auction mechanism. The results from experimental evaluations
show that DEAL outperforms VCG mechanism by providing
maximizing revenue and enhancing utility and network benefit
to a satisfactory level. As a plan of our future work, we intend
to develop a prototype of decentralized private auction with the
help of DApp platform and smart contract.
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